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Comments
Public Utility Takeovers in Kentucky: A

Rare Breed Gets Rarer
INTRODUCTION

The specter of hostile corporate takeovers evidently weighed
heavily upon the minds of legislators in the 1988 Kentucky General
Assembly. In addition to the general antitakeover provisions contained in the new corporate change-of-control statute,' the legislature passed an amendment to Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS)
section 278.0202 to require state approval3 of the acquisition of
control of any public utility4 providing utility services in Kentucky.

I Act of March 4, 1988, ch. 22, §§ 1-4, 1988 Ky. REv. STAT. & R. SERV. 65 (codified
at Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 271A.396-.399) (Baldwin 1988) [hereinafter "KRS"].
2 Act of April 9, 1988, ch. 335, § 1, 1988 Ky. REv. STAT. & R. SERv. 906 (codified
at KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 278.020(5)-(7)) (Baldwin 1988) [hereinafter "KRS"].
3 The Kentucky Public Service Commission [hereinafter "PSC"], the administrative
agency that the General Assembly has charged with the responsibility of overseeing utilities
in Kentucky, "shall approve any such proposed acquisition when it finds that the same is
to be made in accordance with law, for a proper purpose and is consistent with public
interest." Id. at 907 (codified at KRS § 278.020(5)).
4 KRS § 278.010(3) provides the relevant definition of utility as follows:
any person except a city, who owns, controls or operates or manages any
facility used or to be used for or in connection with:
(a) The generation, production, transmission or distribution of electricity
to or for the .public, for compensation, for lights, heat, power or other uses;
(b) The production, manufacture, storage, distribution, sale or furnishing
of natural or manufactured gas, or a mixture of same, to or for the public,
for compensation, for light, heat, power or other uses;
(c) The transporting or conveying of gas, crude oil or other fluid substance by pipeline to or for the public, for compensation;
(d) The diverting, developing, pumping, impounding, distributing or furnishing of water to or for the public, for compensation;
(e) The transmission or conveyance over wire, in air or otherwise, of any
message by telephone or telegraph for the public, for compensation; or
(f) The treatment of sewage for the public, for compensation, if the
facility is a subdivision treatment facility plant, located in a county containing
a city of the first class or a sewage treatment facility located in any other
county and is not subject to regulation by a metropolitan sewer district.
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While the Commonwealth of Kentucky is not new to the business
of regulating the transfer of control of public utilities, 5 this amend-

ment reinforces the state's commitment to the regulation of utility
change-of-control transactions.
Kentucky's utility change-of-control legislation has the potential

to benefit the incumbent management of a utility subject to a
hostile takeover bid. First, the Kentucky statute forces a potential
bidder to seek Public Service Commission (PSC) approval to acquire more than ten percent of the target utility's voting securities
6
and thereby to reveal its intentions with regard to the target utility.

In 1954, Kentucky's highest court held that PSC jurisdiction over the sale of utilities
necessarily was implied "from the statutory powers of the commission to regulate the service
of utilities." Pub. Serv. Comm. v. Cities of Southgate, Highland Heights, 268 S.W.2d 19,
21 (Ky. 1954). "In order to carry out its responsibility" to ensure that service is adequate,
the PSC "must have the opportunity to determine whether the purchaser is ready, willing
and able to continue providing adequate service." Id. See infra notes 119-30 and accompanying text for a discussion of past regulation in Kentucky of the acquisition of public
utilities.
6 While KRS § 278.020(4), the subsection which previously governed utility changeof-control transactions, refers ambiguously to transferring "ownership of or control, or the
right to control, any utility," subsection (5) states:
As used in this subsection, the term "control" means the possession, directly
or indirectly, of the power to direct or cause the direction of the management
and policies of a utility, whether through the ownership of voting securities,
by effecting a chafige in the composition of the board of directors, by contract
or otherwise. Control shall be presumed to exist if any ... individual or
entity, directly or indirectly, owns ten percent (10%) or more of the voting
securities of the utility. This presumption may be rebutted by a showing that
such ownership does not in fact confer control.
KRS 278.020(5) (emphasis added). The PSC conceivably could assert that the new subsection
presumes control at a lower level of ownership than does subsection (4) and thus requires
an acquiror to seek approval from the PSC at a potentially earlier stage of the acquisition
process than before. Such an interpretation thereby would force a hostile bidder to reveal
its intentions at an earlier stage of ownership. The PSC, however, has not yet done so, and
its orders in transfer cases since July 15, 1988, the effective date of subsection (5), have
not addressed directly the possibility that the two subsections have different definitions of
change in control. Compare PSC Order, In re Joint Application of Blue Grass Management
Group, Inc. to Transfer 51 Percent Interest of TMC of Lexington to JTC Communications
Corp. (now J.T. Carneal), And For Authorization to Provide Resale of Telecommunications
Services, Case No. 89-038, at 3 (June 28, 1989) (holding proposed transaction would
"constitut[e] a change in control within the meaning of KRS 278.020(4) and (5)," thereby
implying one meaning) (emphasis added) with PSC Order, In re Joint Application of (1)
Stone Nance, Inc. to Distribute All of its Wholly-owned Subsidiary, Goshen Util., and (2)
James F. Stone, A Shareholder of Stone Nance, Inc. to Sell All of His Stock of Goshen
Utils. to Lloyd Eades, Case No. 10363, at 2 (holding proposed transaction would "not
effect a change of ownership or control of Goshen within the meaning of KRS 278.020(4)
or (5)," thereby implying two meanings) (emphasis added). See also PSC Order, In re The
Joint Filing of Litel Telecommunications Corp., LCI Communications, Inc., and LCI
Communications Holding Co. Respecting the Acquisition of Control of Litel Telecommunications Corp. and Related Financing Transactions, Case No. 10364, at 3-4 (Oct. 26, 1988)
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This caps the equity position that a bidder can attain while still

pursuing its plans in secrecy.7 Second, the time delays inherent in
the PSC approval process 8 bestow upon incumbent management

more time in which to respond to hostile gestures. 9 Such prospects
are likely to dissuade or at least modify many potential attempts

to acquire control of a utility. While there is at least a possibility
that utility change-of-control statutes such as Kentucky's could be
held unconstitutional,' 0 such a result is achievable only after years
of protracted litigation. Hence, this possibility provides little solace
to those acquirors whose current success depends on the specifics

of the present statutory scheme. This Comment examines the regulatory framework in which the statute operates, addresses potential constitutional challenges to the statute, concluding that the
challenges likely will fail, and then briefly examines the application
heretofore of the statute by the PSC.
I. BACKGROUND
Public utilities attract the attention of both investors and regulators in part for the same reason: the continual public demand

(holding KRS 278.020(5) inapplicable because target utility derives greater percentage of
gross revenue from interstate business than from business within Kentucky and proposed
transaction is subject to a review by Federal Communications Commission affording protection to Kentucky ratepayers equal to that afforded by subsection (5), but holding KRS
278.020(4) inapplicable because no change of ownership within meaning of that subsection);
PSC Order, In re The Joint Application of Com/Nav Marine, Inc. and Mobile Communications Corp. of America For Approval of the Distribution of All Its Shares of Coin/
Nay Marine, Inc. to the Shareholders of its Parent Mobile Communications Corp. of
America, Case No. 10393, at 3-4 (Oct. 26, 1988) (same).
I Of course, if the target utility is subject to the registration requirements of section
12(g) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1982), the bidder
must file with the SEC a disclosure report within ten days of acquiring five percent
"beneficial" ownership of any class of the target's securities that are registered. Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934, § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1982).
8 Some delay from the approval process appears inevitable. The new legislation
requires the PSC to act on every "application within sixty (60) days after the filing of the
application," during which time the "commission may make such investigation and hold
such hearings ... as it deems necessary." Act of April 9, 1988, supra note 2 (codified at
KRS § 278.020(5) (Baldwin 1988) ("In the absence of any ... action [by the commission]
within such period of time shall be deemed to be approved.").
I For a discussion of the attraction to a purchaser of a plan of "creeping acquisition"
as well as the options available to a target's management upon learning of such acquisition,
see I A. FLEisCR, JR., TENDER OERs: DEFENSES, REsPoNsEs, AND PLANNING 112-148.1

(1985).
10 The United States Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the constitutionality of state
utility antitakeover legislation, and other courts that have considered the question are not
in agreement. For a discussion of pertinent constitutional issues, see infra notes 62-118 and
accompanying text.
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for utilities' products coupled with the inherent technical difficulties
of providing those products make most utilities natural monopolies." Indeed, technical peculiarities require that competition be
restricted in order for some utilities to operate efficiently and
profitably. 2 Such restrictions in turn necessitate the regulation of

utility rates and services for the protection of the consuming pub3
4
lic.

Thus, regulation replaces competition to a certain extent.

The same considerations underlie the regulation of utility acquisitions and mergers. Since protection of the consuming public is the
primary objective of such regulation, private investor interests should
be respected to the extent they are not detrimental to the public

interest. 5

II.

REGULATION OF UTILITY TAKEOVERS

In 1986, it appeared that the spate of takeover activity in the
rest of corporate America might spread to the utility industry.
Spurred by the business press' 6 "as well as by investment bankers

and lawyers eager to provide takeover defense advice,'

'7

many

" In addition to continual demand and the inherent difficulties involved, utilities'
often severely localized markets contribute to their status as "natural monopolies." J.
BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILrrY RATEs 4, 11-12 (1961). Some kinds of utilities,
however, are considered partially competitive (railroads, waterways, pipelines, cable television). C. W-cox & W. SHEPHmRD, PUBLIC POLICIS TowARD BusINEss 334 (5th ed. 1975).

,2 Substantial technological advancements have led some economists to question whether
the concept of a "natural monopoly" has not become outdated in some industries. Stelzer,
A Policy Guide for Utility Executives: "Know When to Hold 'em; Know When to Fold
'em". PUB. UTIL. FORT., Oct. 9, 1980, at 62 (argument that copy-by-wire is a competitive
alternative to the postal monopoly).
" The purpose of utility regulation is to protect the public in its collective role as
consumer. J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 11, at 4; see also Jones, Origins of the Certificate of
Public Convenience and Necessity: Developments in the States, 1870-1920, 79 CoLUM. L.
Rnv. 426 (1979) (identifying the balance of investor and consumer interests involved in rate
regulation as one of the primary purposes of utility regulation). But cf. Jarrell, The Demand
for State Regulation of the Electric Utility Industry, 21 J.L. & EcoN. 269 (1979) (arguing
that state regulation is in the economic interests of utilities and rejecting the conventional
rationale for regulation, viz., the protection of public interest).
1I

A.J. PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF

UTILITY REGULATION

1-7 (1969).

,1 See infra notes 118-30, 178-84 and accompanying text for a discussion of what
constitutes the "public interest."
16 Laing, Power Play: Will Takeover Lightning Strike the Electric Utilities?, BARRON'S,
June 2, 1986, at 8; see also Ozanian, Looking Past Chernobyl, FORMaS, June 2, 1986, at
234 (examines appeal of electric utilities' cash flow); Stavro, Power Brokers, FORBES, June
16, 1986, at 54 (discusses the role of Catalyst Energy Development Corp. in the takeover
of Alamito Co., a power wholesaler).
" D. HAWES, UTIITY HOLDING CoNAmtP

s,

§

12.02, at 12-10 (1987).
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utility industry executives prepared for battle. 18 Some even sought
and obtained state utility change-of-control statutes.' 9 Yet, because

of significant legal obstacles, 20 there have been relatively few utility
2
takeovers or mergers in the past five years. '

A.

Federal Regulation

Potential utility acquirors are faced with a comprehensive federal system of securities laws governing various means of effecting
a change of corporate control, including cash tender offers, 22 proxy
contests,23 and mergers. 24 By far the most substantial federal im-

pediment to most utility takeovers, however, is the Public Utility
Holding Company Act of 1935 (PUHCA).25 Enacted in response
to the financial collapse of a number of utility holding companies
in the 1920's and early 1930's, 26 PUHCA was designed "to curb

abusive practices of public utility companies by bringing them
under effective control and to provide effective regulation of the

'1Utilities have adopted a variety of defensive measures, including staggered boards
of directors, "fair price amendments," and "anti-greenmail" measures. Others have adopted
"so-called poison pills or, more euphemistically, stockholder rights plans." D. HAwEs,
supra note 17, § 12.05, at 12-42.
19New Jersey's utility change-of-control statute, for example, N.J. STAT. Am. § 48:251.1 (West Supp. 1989), was signed into law on January 31, 1984, in the midst of the NULI/
NJR takeover battle. Kentucky's utility change-of-control statute, KRS § 278.020(5), also
appears to have been the product of the utility industry's lobbying efforts. As it first
appeared in H.B. 460, the new change-of-control statute applied only to retail electric
suppliers. Ch. 22, H.B. 460, 1988 Ky. REv. STAT. & R. SERV. 72 (Baldwin), amended by
Act of April 9, 1988, ch. 335, § 1, 1988 KY. REv. STAT. & R. SERv. 906, 907 (Baldwin).
It is unlikely that public interest groups concerned with the effect of utility takeovers on
consumers would pursue protection for so specific an industry.
2 The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 [hereinafter PUHCA] and state
utility change-of-control statutes are the principal legal obstacles to utility mergers and
acquisitions. Hawes, Utility Takeovers: Considerable Talk, Not Much Action, LEG;AL Tims,
October 20, 1986, at 13. See infra notes 25-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of
PUHCA's impact on utility takeovers.
21 Hawes, supra note 20, at 13.
15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(f), 78n(d)-(e) (1982).
15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)-(c) (1982).
14When state law requires shareholder approval for mergers, federal law regulates the
proxy-voting process. See id. When shares are exchanged in a merger, the registration
requirements of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982), might apply.
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z-6 (1982).
16 See D. HAwas, supra note 17, at § 2.04. For further discussion of the plethora of
pre-PUHCA abuses, see Comment, FederalRegulation of Holding Companies: The Public
Utility Act of 1935, 45 YiA L.J. 468 (1936).
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expanding business[es] of [generating,] transmitting and selling elec-

tric power '

27 and

distributing natural gas.2

In response to the speculative and often unsuccessful past di-

versification of public utility holding companies29 and the more
than occasional use of deceptive financing practices possible under
complex holding company structures, 30 PUHCA "substantially lim-

its both investments by public utilities in other companies and
' 31
investments by other companies in public utilities."

PUHCA thereby imposes on public utility takeovers in a number of ways. 32 If the target company consists of two or more
jurisdictional utilities,3 3 prior approval by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)34 is required pursuant to Section 9(a)(2)
3
of PUHCA to acquire five percent or more of the target's stocky.

Also, if the acquiror is a utility or a jurisdictional utility holding
company, 36 or owns at least five percent of a utility or utility

holding company, the SEC must approve in advance the purchase
of five percent or more of any target that is a utility or utility

" Gulf States Utils. Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 411 U.S. 747, 758 (1973).

PUHCA only affects gas and electric utilities. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 79b(a)(3), (4)
(1982).
For example, Middle West Utilities Systems, a utility holding company with 111
subsidiaries, itself part of the Insull Utility System behemoth (one of three super holding

companies that together controlled about 49% of the investor-owned electric utility industry
in 1932), acquired cotton mills just when that industry went into a slump, and paper mills
when that industry reached overcapacity. The leverage used to acquire these properties
magnified the losses sustained by the holding company. D. HAWES, supra note 17, §§ 2.03,

2.04, at 2-5, 2-12 & 2-13.
30Such practices include the manipulation of service charges made by holding companies to utilities, the recognition by holding companies of income from the sale of assets
at inflated prices to controlled subsidiaries, and other nefarious accounting practices. See
D. HAwas, supra note 17, § 2.04, at 12-13, 12-14.
11Elmer & Mazo, Utility Takeovers and the Holding Company Act, PuB. UTn.
FORT., September 30, 1982, at 17.
32 For a more complete treatment, see D. HAwas, supra note 17, § 12.02; Elmer &
Mazo, supra note 31. The act also affects non-stock-transfer acquisitions to the extent that
such alternatives are chosen to avoid the act's strictures.
13 E.g., a holding company with two or more utility subsidiaries or a utility with a
least one utility subsidiary will qualify.
3, The SEC approval criteria are set forth in § 10(b) of PUHCA. They reflect legislative
concern with utility holding company diversification into non-utility operations, the concentration of utility company control, inequities in consideration paid for control interests, and
undue complications of the utility holding company system.
35 15 U.S.C. § 79i(a)(2) (1982). Because the act applies when there are two or more
utilities involved, it is known as the "two bite" rule. See D. HAwas, supra note 17, § 3.06,
at 3-40.
36 PUHCA defines "holding company" as a corporation that owns ten percent or
more of any gas or electric utility. 15 U.S.C. § 79b(9)(7) (1982).
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holding company, or that owns at least five percent of a utility
holding company. 37 Where the target is a utility (or owns at least
five percent of one) and the acquiror is not a jurisdictional utility
(nor owns five percent or more of one), the acquiror becomes a
holding company subject to PUHCA regulation upon acquisition
of at least ten percent ownership of the target. If the acquiror
obtains ten percent or more but less than fifty-one percent of the
target's stock, it must either register as a holding company, 38 file
for an exemption from registration, 39 or file for an order declaring
that such ownership does not constitute a controlling influence,
and that, therefore, the acquiror is not a holding company. ° Finally, upon acquisition of fifty-one percent or more of a target
that includes a utility, the acquiror must register as a holding
company4' or seek an exemption.4 2 This comprehensive regulatory
scheme presents significant obstacles to potential utility acquisitions
and, in a hostile contest, can provide management with critical
43
time in which to take defensive action.
Depending on the form of transaction, other federal regulations
may apply. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
44 over
has jurisdiction pursuant to the Federal Power Act (FPA)
4
5
sales and other dispositions of jurisdictional facilities and over
issuances of securities by utilities that are subject to the FERC

37

15 U.S.C. § 79i(a)(2) (1982).

3,

In light of PUHCA's stringent requirements for registered utility holding companies,

this is considered by some to be a totally impractical alternative. See D. HAwEs, supra note
17, § 12.02, at 12-3; PUHCA § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 79k (1982) (requiring simplification of
holding companies so that they consist of single, localized utility systems with only narrowlydefined related assets). See generally D. HAWES, supra note 17, § 3.03.
31This is not always a practical alternative either, since PUHCA's requirements
generally limit registration exemptions to intrastate operations. See PUHCA § 3 (15 U.S.C.
§ 79c (1982)); see also Eastern Utils. Assocs., 43 S.E.C. 243 (1967) (declaring SEC's policy
that minority interests in utility subsidiaries of exempt holding companies are impermissible).
See generally D. HAwas, supra note 17, §§ 3.04, 12.02, at 12-4.
40 See PUHCA § 2(a)(7) (15 U.S.C. § 79b(a)(7) (1982)).
" See supra note 38.
,1See supra note 39.
11 It appears, however, that a utility that merely acquires five percent or more of
another utility in order to subject any acquisition attempt to SEC scrutiny cannot avail
itself of the defense. See Midlands Energy v. Eumar Oil (D. Colo. 1984) (holding such a
ploy in contravention of PUHCA's policies against undue complexities) (cited in Hawes,
supra note 20, at 9).
" 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-823a (1982).
41 Federal Power Act [hereinafter FPA] § 202, 16 U.S.C. § 824b(a) (1982).
For a
discussion of what constitutes a jurisdictional facility, see Iowa Illinois Gas & Elec. Co.,
35 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) 61,287 (1986).

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 78

regulation. 46 A takeover could involve either situation, thereby
invoking FERC's jurisdiction. 47 Also relevant are general federal
securities law requirements governing corporate acquisitions, 4 the

Natural Gas Act (NGA), 49 the Communications Act of 1934

50°

and,

when substantial stock purchases are involved, federal antitrust

laws.-' Clearly, federal law thoroughly regulates potential utility
takeovers. Yet one commentator suggests that, because of the
obstacle of getting prior state PSC approval for financing hostile
utility takeovers, "state PSC regulatory issues [are] the highest
52
hurdle."
B.

State Regulation

Until several years ago, few states had statutes dealing specifically with the change of control of utilities.53 This has changed,
however, as the general corporate anxiety over hostile takeovers
has spread to the utility industry.5 4 States now regulate the change
of control or ownership of public utilities through (1) statutes that
specifically prohibit one from obtaining a certain percentage of

ownership of a public utility without prior PSC approval, 5 (2)

FPA § 204 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824c(a)).
47 See Hawes, supra note 20, at 14.
41 See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text. For a discussion of relevant federal
securities law, see also Elmer & Mazo, supra note 31, at 18-20.
,9 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717z (1982). The NGA may be relevant to the change of control
of facilities involved in the interstate transportation and sale of natural gas. Although the
NGA does not confer expressly jurisdiction upon the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) over change-of-control transactions, approval may be necessary if such transactions
involve the abandonment of facilities, the extension of facilities, or the issuance of securities.
See id. § 717F (1982); Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293,
-,
108 S. Ct.
1145, 1151 (1988) (holding FERC's "comprehensive authority" over interstate transportation
and sale of natural gas includes "a number of tools for examining the issuance of securities").
'. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-613 (1982). The Communications Act of 1934 requires Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) approval of certain telephone company consolidations
and acquisitions. Id. § 221.
s, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1311-14 (1982).
D. HAwEs, supra note 17, at xxi.
S3 D. HAwEs, supra note 17, § 12.03, at 12-35.
' See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
" ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 23-3-306 (1987) (requiring PSC approval for merger or change
of control); CAL. PuB. UT,. CODE § 854 (West 1975) (bars acquisition of a utility without
PSC approval); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 16-47(c) (West Supp. 1989) (requires PSC
approval for acquisition of control of gas, electric, or water utility); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
26, §215 (Supp. 1988) (requires PSC approval for utility change of control) (For a discussion
of effect of statute on South Jersey Industries' attempted acquisition of Chesapeake Utilities
46
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statutes that prohibit one utility from gaining possession of another
utility without prior PSC approval, 56 and (3) statutes relating to
holding companies5 7 and takeover bids 8 that indirectly may require
PSC approval. 9 While it is unclear to what extent these statutes
are constitutionally permissible, 6° compliance with them nonetheless
61
is recommended strongly.
In addition to state statutes specifically directed at the utility
industry, state general antitakeover statutes also deserve consider-

Corp., see D. HAwEs, supra note 17, § 12.02, at 12-29); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 2/3, para.
7-204 (Smith-Hurd 1988) (requires prior PSC approval for utility reorganizations that result
in a change in majority stock ownership); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 278.020 (Baldwin 1988)
(bars acquisition of control of utility without prior PSC approval); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:310 (West Supp. 1989) (bars utility from transferring majority stock interest without prior
commission approval); N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 70 (McKinney Supp. 1989) (requires PSC
consent to acquisition of more than ten percent of voting capital stock); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 62-111 (1982) (requires PSC approval for change of control); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17,
§ 191.5 (West 1986) (requires approval for change of control); OR. Rav. STAT. § 757.511
(1987) (requires PSC to approve or disapprove change of control within nineteen days); W.
VA. CODE § 24-2-12 (Supp. 1989) (requires PSC approval for acquisition of majority of a
utility's common stock).
- ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-3-303 (1987) (approval required for domestic utility to acquire
control of another domestic utility); HAw. REV. STAT. § 269-19 (1985) (requires approval
for merger between utilities); ME. Ray. STAT. ANN. tit. 35A, § 1103 (1988) (requires
Commission authorization for one utility to acquire capital stock of another); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 78, § 24(b), (c) (19 ) (requires PSC approval for a utility to issue securities or
acquire any part of another utility, and prohibits the acquisition of a Maryland utility by
all except other Maryland utilities of same class with PSC approval); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
62-6-12 (1984) (requires consent for one utility to merge or acquire stock or assets of
another); N.D. CENrr. CODE § 49-04-06 (1978) (requires PSC authorization for one utility
to acquire stock of another); OR. REv. STAT. § 757.485 (1987) (requires PSC approval for
one utility to acquire another); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1102 (Purdon Supp. 1989)
(requires certificate from PSC for utility mergers); UTAH CODE ANN. § 54-4-28 (1986)
(requires approval of mergers between two utilities); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 107 (1986)
(requires board approval for one utility to acquire controlling interest in another); VA. CODE
ANN. § 56-89 (1986) (requires Commission approval for a utility to acquire any utility asset
or security).
"
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 35-A § 707 (1988); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 62-3-3 (1984).
5' HAw. REv. STAT. § 417E-1 (1985) (general corporate takeover statute amended to
cover only public utilities, land companies, and banks); N.J. REv. STAT. § 48:2-51.1 (1989)
(takeover attempts must be approved by Board of Public Utilities). For a discussion of the
relevancy of general state antitakeover statutes, see infra notes 62-72 and accompanying
text.
s, See D. HAwEs, supra note 17, § 12.03, at 12-35, 12-36, 12-37 (dividing relevant
state statutes into these three categories).
10 The United States Supreme Court has yet to pass on the constitutionality of state
utility change-of-control statutes. For a discussion of relevant constitutional questions, see
infra notes 62-118 and accompanying text.
6! See Hawes, supra note 20, at 14 (counsel for acquiror should plan to comply with
utility change-of-control statutes).
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ation. 62 In the late 1960's and the 1970's, a number of states
responded to growing concerns about hostile corporate takeovers
by enacting statutes, most of which were subsequently invalidated
or repealed, setting forth tender offer disclosure requirements. 63
Typically, these "first-generation"64 regulations entailed significant
pre-offer filing and notification requirements. 65 Additionally, they
often required state administrative hearings regarding the adequacy
of disclosure and, in some cases, the fairness of the bid before the
consummation of any offer." Thirty-seven states had enacted such
6
statutes 67 by the time the Supreme Court in Edgar v. MITE Corp. 1
struck down the Illinois Business Takeover Act69 as an unconsti-

tutional burden on interstate commerce.7 0 A plurality of three
justices 71 also found the Illinois statute pre-empted under the supremacy clause by the Williams Act. 72
A plurality of four justices73 found that the Illinois statute was
a direct burden on interstate commerce because it had the potential
to regulate transactions that took place wholly outside the state of
Illinois and involved foreign corporations. 74 The statute could be
triggered even if none of the target's shareholders were Illinois
62
63

See D. HAwEs, supra note 17, § 12.03, at 12-37.
See 3 R. WINTER, R. ROSENBAUM, M. STUMF & L.S. PARKER, SHARK REPELLANTS

AND GOLDEN PARACH TES: A HANDBOOK FOR THE PRACTITIONER, STATE TAKEOVER STATUTES
AND POISON PILLs § 1.1, at 3 (1988) [hereinafter STATE TAKEOVER STATUTES].

" "First-Generation" refers to the fact that these first state attempts to regulate
takeovers subsequently were invalidated as unconstitutional by Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457
U.S. 624 (1982), and its progeny.
" See STATE TAKEOVER STATUTES, supra note 63, § 1.1, at 3; see also ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 121 1/2, para. 137.54.A (1979) (repealed 1983) (held unconstitutional in MITE, 457
U.S. 624).
6See
STATE TAKEOVER STATUTES, supra note 63, § 1.1, at 3; see also ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 121 1/2, para. 137.57A, E (1979) (repealed 1983) (allowed any Illinois shareholder
owning 10% of target's stock to demand a hearing on fairness of the tender offer).
67 See Winn, The Williams Act and Preemption of Second Generation State Takeover
Legislation, 65 WAsH. U.L.Q. 292, 294 (1987).
- 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
60 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 137.51-.70 (1979) (repealed 1983).
70 A plurality of four Justices found that the Illinois statute was a direct burden on
interstate commerce and, consequently, a per se violation of the commerce clause. MITE,
457 U.S. at 641-43. The majority, however, found the statute unconstitutional because it
imposed an impermissible indirect burden on interstate commerce. Id. at 643-46.
71 Justice White was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun in his
conclusion that the statute conflicted with the Williams Act and therefore was pre-empted.
Id. at 634-40.
- 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(i), 78m(d), (e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982).
73 Justice White was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stevens and O'Connor
in his conclusion that the statute constituted a direct burden on interstate commerce.
7, MITE, 457 U.S. at 641-43.
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residents.7 5 Because of the Illinois statute's propensity to affect
takeovers completely outside the state of Illinois, the plurality
found that under prevailing Supreme Court jurisprudence7 6 the
Illinois statute was an unconstitutional direct burden on interstate
77

commerce.
Justice Powell joined this plurality in finding the statute unconstitutional as an impermissible indirect burden on interstate
commerce. 78 Applying the balancing test enunciated in Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc. ,79 the Court compared the burden on interstate

commerce to the local interests served by the statute. 80 "[E]ven

when a statute regulates interstate commerce indirectly, the burden

imposed on that commerce must not be excessive in relation to the
local interests served by the statute. ' 8' This majority, in accordance
with the then-prevailing scholarly sentiment,8 2 placed great value

on the "reallocation of economic resources to their highest valued
use, a process which can improve efficiency and competition.''83

While state governments might have an interest in "protecting local
investors, '"8 such an interest is outweighed by a national interest

in a smoothly functioning market for corporate securities. Therefore, the Illinois Act "imposes a substantial burden on interstate
commerce which outweighs its putative local benefits ... [and] is
'
accordingly invalid under the commerce clause.

85

15 The Illinois statute applied to every tender offer for a corporation meeting certain
conditions, regardless of whether any of the corporation's shareholders were residents of
Illinois. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 137.52-10(2) (1979) (repealed 1983).
76 Id.; see Schaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 197 (1977) ("[A]ny attempt 'directly' to
assert extraterritorial jurisdiction over persons or property would ... exceed the inherent
limits of the State's power."); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 775 (1945)
("[P]ractical effect of such regulation is to control ... [conduct] beyond the boundaries of
the state." Therefore, such a regulation is prohibited.).
MITE, 457 U.S. at 643.
7,Id. at 646 (Powell, J., concurring in part) (joining Justice white's conclusion that
statute imposes impermissible burden on interstate commerce because his "reasoning leaves
some room for state regulation of tender offers").
19 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
MITE, 457 U.S. at 641-44.
Id. at 643.
2 Id.
(citing for support Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. Rv. 1161 (1981)).
" Id. Justice Powell, however, whose vote was needed to form a majority, plainly
did not accept this idealized view of hostile takeovers. Id. at 646-47 (Powell, J., concurring)
(Justice Powell implies that "in some circumstances ... greater protection to interests that
include ... incumbent management" may be legitimate.).
Id. at 644.
Id. at 646.
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Justice White was joined by only two other justices86 in his
conclusion that the Illinois statute was pre-empted under the su-

premacy clause by the Williams Act8 7 and, therefore, was unconstitutional. The Williams Act, enacted in 1968 as an amendment
to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,11 was intended not to
pre-empt the entire field of securities regulation with respect to
cash tender offers, 9 but rather to provide for certain filing and

disclosure requirements in connection with tender offers. 9° Justice

White, however, felt that the Illinois statute frustrated three important principles of the Williams Act. First, the Illinois statute
upset the Williams Act's uniform national regulatory scheme of

strict neutrality between the incumbent management of the target
company and the offeror. 91 Second, the Illinois statute could pre-

vent a tender offer from going forward "without unreasonable
delay." ' 92 Third, by empowering the Illinois Secretary of State to

pass on the fairness of a tender offer, the Illinois statute ran
contrary to the goal of the Williams Act that investors be the final
arbiters of the fairness of any tender offer. 93 Justice White there-

fore concluded that the Illinois Act conflicted with and was preempted by the Williams Act. 94
After MITE, courts continued to find state antitakeover statutes unconstitutional, 95 and many states amended their statutes to
conform with post-MITE expectations. 96 Rather than regulating

16 Id.
at 630-31. Justice White was joined in his supremacy clause analysis by Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun. Justices Powell and Stevens disagreed, while the rest
of the Court did not address the issue. See id. at 646-47 (Powell, J., concurring in part);
id. at 655 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
- 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(i), 78m(d), (e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982).
u 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982).
11The Williams Act did not amend § 28(a) of the 1934 Act. Section 28(a) provides

in pertinent part: "Nothing in this title shall affect the jurisdiction ... of any state over
any security or any person insofar as it does not conflict with the provisions of this title or
the rules and regulations thereunder." 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1982).
9015 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), (e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982 and Supp. 11 1984).
91MITE, 457 U.S. at 634-46. "[B]y providing the target company with additional
time with which ... to combat the offer, ... the [Act's] provisions furnish incumbent
management with a powerful tool to combat tender offers, perhaps to the detriment of
stockholders." Id. at 635.
Id. at 639.
91Id. at 639-40.
94 Id.

91See, e.g., Nat'l City Lines v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1982) (precommencement disclosure requirements invalidated); Esmark, Inc. v. Strode, 639 S.W.2d
768 (Ky. 1982) (pre-commencement disclosure requirements invalidated).
9See STATE TAKEOVER STATuTEs, supra note 63, at 3-6.
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tender offers directly, these second-generation statutes attempt to
effect the same goals of direct regulation through use of the states'
traditional power of corporate governance. 97 States have enacted

antitakeover legislation in the form of control share acquisition
statutes, 9 business combination statutes, 99 fair price statutes,""' and
cash-out statutes.' 1 After these statutes received a generally unfavorable reception from the lower courts,'0 2 the Supreme Court
considered and upheld a second-generation state antitakeover stat-

ute, the Indiana Control Share Acquisition Statute, 0 3 in CTS Corp.
v. Dynamics Corp. of America.' 4 In so doing, the Supreme Court
gave new life to state antitakeover legislation.
The Court upheld the Indiana statute against both commerce
clause and supremacy clause attacks. 0 5 The Court premised its

commerce clause analysis on two factors.101 First, corporate law is
by nature extraterritorial in impact. 0 7 Second, corporate law historically has been the prerogative of the chartering state. 0 One

commentator suggests the court felt that "if it mandated a balancing approach simply because of extraterritorial effects of the statute, it would open up all corporate law principles to similar

challenge."' 9 Indeed, Justice Scalia in his concurrence asserted
that once a statute is found to neither discriminate against interstate
commerce, nor create an impermissible risk of inconsistent state
regulations, the commerce clause inquiry should end."10 In fact, the
9Id.at 3-4.
9 Id. at 15-26.
" ld. at 27-39.
,01
Id. at 41-50.
101Id. at 51-60.
- See, e.g., Terry v. Yamashita, 643 F. Supp. 161 (D. Haw. 1986) (invalidating a
control share acquisition statute).
,0,
IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-I to -II (West Supp. 1987).
,0481 U.S. 69 (1987).
,os
For a thorough discussion of CTS and its implications, see Langervoort, The
Supreme Court and the Politics of Corporate Takeovers: A Comment on CTS Corp. v.
Dynamics Corp. of America, 101 HAv.L. REV. 96 (1987).
106

Id. at 103.

1'7

Id.

MId.; see also CTS Corp.

v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 89-92 (1987).
An important question left open by CTS that is relevant to utility change-of-control statutes
is whether, in order to find the appropriate nexus between a corporation and a regulating
state, it is necessary for the state to be the place of incorporation, merely home to substantial
corporate assets, the corporation's principal place of business, or any combination thereof.
See STATE TAKEOVER STruTa S, supra note 63, at 147-52. See infra notes 135-56 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the nexus issue in the utility context.
,o9
Langervoort, supra note 105, at 106.
110CTS, 481 U.S. at 94-96.
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balancing test itself is "an inquiry ... ill suited to the judicial

function and should be undertaken rarely if at all.""' From this
reasoning comes the corollary that federal courts should not ques-

tion the validity of state corporation law absent some concrete
indication of discrimination against interstate commerce.1 2
In its supremacy clause analysis, the Court found that, even
under the MITE plurality's broad interpretation of the principles
underlying the Williams Act, 3 the Indiana statute should be upheld
since it does not frustrate those principles." 4 The Court found that
the Indiana statute furthers the Williams Act's goal of protecting

investor autonomy," 5 and that compliance with both statutes is
entirely possible." 6 Thus, the Court concluded the Indiana statute

was not pre-empted under the supremacy clause. 1 7

The breadth that lower courts give the holding in CTS undoubtedly will affect both supremacy clause and commerce clause
challenges to other second generation statutes as well as to state
utility change-of-control statutes. As mentioned above, the Su-

preme Court has not considered the constitutionality of the latter.""

" Id. at 95 (Scalia, J., concurring). For support of Justice Scalia's position, see, e.g.,
Langervoort, supra note 105, at 103-04; Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics
Corp. of America and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II) ExtraterritorialState
Legislation, 85 MIcH. L. REv. 1865, 1866-68 (1987).
332 "In many respects, the Court's hands-off approach in CTS is a return to an
older
style of commerce clause analysis, in which a determination that an issue was particularly
suited for state-by-state regulation effectively ended the inquiry." Langervoort, supra note
105, at 103 n.45; see, e.g., S. Carolina State Highways Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S.
177 (1938).
'13 See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying
text.
"' "As the plurality opinion in MITE did not represent the views of a majority ...
we are not bound by its reasoning. We need not question that reasoning, however, because
... the Indiana Act passes muster even under the broad interpretation of the Williams
Act." CTS, 481 U.S. at 81. This interpretation leaves open the question of the extent of
the Williams Act's pre-emptive reach.
'is Id.
336 Id.
at 79.
"
"[Aibsent an explicit indication by Congress of an intent to pre-empt state law, a
state law is pre-empted only 'where compliance with both federal and state regulation is a
physical impossibility . . .,' [or] if [the state law] frustrates the purposes of the federal
law." Id. at 78-79 (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132,
142-43 (1963)). For a recent discussion of appropriate pre-emption analysis, see Schneidewind
v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293 (1988).
"I See supra note 10 and accompanying text. Furthermore, only one federal court of
appeals has addressed this issue. In Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Heinz, 760 F.2d 1408
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 847 (1985), the court, applying the balancing test announced
in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970), upheld a Maryland statute banning
outright utility ownership (10% or more) by any holding company not already owning a
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Unfortunately, the uncertainty surrounding the constitutionality of
state utility change-of-control statutes likely will remain until it
does.
C. Past Regulation in Kentucky
As mentioned above, Kentucky is not new to the business of
regulating the sale and acquisition of control of public utilities. In
Public Service Commission v. Cities of Southgate, Highland
Heights,"1 9 Kentucky's highest court held that, although "the governing statute, KRS Chapter 278, does not in express terms confer
jurisdiction upon the Public Service Commission to pass upon sales
of utility systems," such "jurisdiction is implied necessarily from
the statutory powers of the commission to regulate the service of
utilities.' 12 Because the PSC is "charged with responsibility, and
vested with power, to see that the service of public utilities is
adequate," the PSC, "in order to carry out its responsibility, must
have the opportunity to determine whether the purchaser is ready,
willing, and able to continue providing adequate service.' 2'
In Southgate, several cities that obtained water service from
Union Light, Heat and Power Company sought to overturn the
PSC's approval of a sale of that company's water system to Commonwealth Water Company and to purchase the water system
themselves.12 The PSC, while asserting its authority to pass on the
sale, declined to extend its inquiry into whether the cities or Commonwealth could provide the most economical service. 23 Rather,
the PSC limited its inquiry to whether the purchaser, Commonwealth, was "ready, willing, and able" to provide water service in

utility. A federal district court, in a decision before the Supreme Court's ruling in CTS,
held that federal securities law pre-empted a New Jersey utility change-of-control statute.
N.U.I. Corp. v. Kimmelman, 593 F. Supp. 1457, 1470 (D.N.J. 1984). Upon review, however,
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed on grounds that since the state had
made no effort to enforce the statute, the corporation lacked standing to challenge its
constitutionality. N.U.I. Corp. v. Kimmelman, 765 F.2d 399 (3d Cir. 1985). Because the
court of appeals did not comment on the merits, the district court's decision is of limited
precedential value. For a discussion of constitutional issues in the context of change-ofcontrol statutes in a similarly regulated industry, the insurance industry, see Sheffey, The
Unconstitutionality of State Insurance Takeover Statutes: An Unfortunate But Not Necessarily FinalResult, 69 MmN. L. RPyv. 821 (1985).
-9 268 S.W.2d 19 (Ky. 1954).
12 Id.
at 21.
121

Id.

11

Id. at 20.
Id. at 21.

2
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the area. 2 4 The court endorsed this limitation,125 but noted that,

"[ijn passing upon the ability of Commonwealth to provide adequate service, the Commission necessarily considered the financial
structure of Commonwealth, and the probabilities of Commonwealth being able to operate successfully from a financial standpoint.' ' 26 Thus, a standard emerged under which the PSC did not
hinge its approval on either the fairness of the proposed transaction
or the transaction's potential effect on rates, but rather upon
whether the acquiror was "ready, willing, and able to provide
2
adequate service."'' 27 This standard prevailed for over twenty years, 8

was subsequently codified, 29 and continues to animate the PSC's
evaluation of utility change-of-control transactions. 310
III.

KENTUCKY'S NEw UTILITY CHANGE-OF-CONTROL STATUTE

On March 4, 1988, the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky approved an Act relating to business combi-

124

Id.

The court declared: "From a mere grant of power to regulate rates and service, we
are unwilling to imply a declaration of policy that ... the type of ownership that will
provide the lowest rates is the only type of ownership that will be permitted to operate a
utility service." Id.
,26Id. at 21-22.
127 Id. at 21. Of course, as the court alluded, an acquiror in severe financial straits
would not be "ready" or "able to provide adequate service," notwithstanding its willingness.
Id. at 20-21.
"I See, e.g., Bluegrass State Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 382 S.W.2d 81 (Ky.
1964) (holding that PSC, in denying a certificate of convenience and necessity to a utility
purchaser, improperly considered effect of disparity between cost basis and sale price on
future rates and that PSC was bound by standard in Southgate); City of Cattletsburg v.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 486 S.W.2d 62, 64 (Ky. 1972) (holding that Commission properly
limited scope of its hearings to question of whether purchaser was "ready, willing, and able
to continue providing adequate service").
'9 The General Assembly enacted Kentucky's first utility change-of-control legislation
in 1986. Act of April 9, 1986, ch. 368, 1986 Ky. REv. STAT. & R. SERv. 845 (codified at
KRS § 278.020(4) (Baldwin 1988)). The approval standard was remodeled in language but
not in meaning. The applicable part of the statute provides that "[t]he Commission shall
grant its approval if the person acquiring the utility has the financial, technical, and
managerialabilities to provide reasonable service." KRS § 278.020(4) (Baldwin 1988) (emphasis added). Indeed, in granting Energas Co. permission to acquire ownership and control
of Western Kentucky Gas Utility Corp. from Texas American Energy Corp. pursuant to
this statute, the PSC found "Energas is ready, willing and able to operate WKG, and has
the financial, technical and managerial abilities to operate WKG so that the customers of
WKG continue to receive reasonable service." PSC Order, In re Case No. 10063 (December
18, 1987).
"M For a discussion of the PSC's treatment of utility change-of-control transactions
subsequent to the effective date of the new legislation, see infra notes 178-84 and accompanying text.
'"
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nations.' Section five of that Act amended KRS section 278.020
by adding a new subsection regarding the acquisition of control of
retail electric suppliers that furnish retail electric service in Kentucky. 32 Subsequently amended to encompass such acquisitions of
all utilities, 3 3 the new Act provides that no acquiror,
whether or not organized under the laws of this state, shall
acquire control, 34 either directly or indirectly of any utility furnishing utility service in this state, 35 without having first obtained
approval of the commission. 36 Any such acquisition of control37
without such priorauthorization shall be void and of no effect.
Subsection 6 of the new Act exempts from operation of subsection 5
M Act of March 4, 1988, supra note 1.
Act of March 4, 1988, supra note 1, at 73 (was to be codified at KRS § 278.020(5),
but was amended by Act of April 9, 1988, supra note 1).
" Act of April 9, 1988, supra note 2.
112

11,The Act defines control as

the possession directly or indirectly, of the power to direct or cause the
direction of the management and policies of a utility, whether through the
ownership of voting securities, by effecting a change in the composition of
the board of directors, by contract or otherwise. Control shall be presumed
to exist if any ... individual or entity, directly or indirectly, owns ten percent
(10%) or more of the voting securities of the utility. This presumption may
be rebutted by a showing that such ownership does not in fact confer control.
KRS § 278.020(5) (Baldwin 1988).
M For the statutory definition of "utility," see KRS § 278.010 (Baldwin 1988), reprinted in pertinentpart supra note 4.
11 Requests for approval shall be ruled on within 60 days after filing the application.
In the absence of action within this period, approval shall be deemed granted. Act of April
9, 1988, supra note 1 (codified at KRS § 278.020(5) (Baldwin 1988)).
"I Act of April 9, 1988, supra note 2 (codified at KRS § 278.020(5) (Baldwin 1988))
(emphasis added). While subsection (5) of KRS § 278.020 specifically states that "any...
acquisition of control without ... prior [PSC] authorization shall be void and of no
effect," subsection (4) is silent as to the effectiveness of change-of-control transactions
undertaken without prior PSC approval. Indeed, the PSC has given after-the-fact recognition
to change-of-control transactions subject to subsection (4) approval but not to subsection
(5) approval. See, e.g., PSC Order, In re Investigation into the Operating Status of
Brownsboro Utils., Case No. 10395 (Sep. 29, 1988) (confirming a completed transfer of
control of sewer system where transaction effecting transfer occurred prior to July 15, 1988
and was therefore not subject to approval under subsection (5)); PSC Order, In re Investigation into the Operating Status of Park Lake, Inc., Case No. 10322 (July 19, 1988)
(same). This discrepancy assumes significance only where the transaction is subject to
approval under subsection (4) but not under subsection (5). With transactions completed
after July 15, 1988, this can happen only if one of the parties involved in the transfer of
control is subject to the PSC's jurisdiction and either the transaction is exempted from the
application of subsection (5) by subsection (6), see infra text accompanying notes 138-39,
or subsection (5) is invalidated by the courts and subsection (4) is left to stand alone
pursuant to the section's severability clause, KRS § 278.020(7). See supra note 130 and
accompanying text.
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any acquisition of control of any:
(a) Utility which derives a greater percentage of its gross revenue
from business in another jurisdiction than from business in this
state if the commission determines that the other jurisdiction has
statutes or rules which are applicable and are being applied and
which afford protection to ratepayers in this state substantially
equal to that afforded such ratepayers by subsection (5) of this
section;
(b) Utility by an [affiliated]"' acquirer . ..; or
(c) Utility pursuant to the terms of any indebtedness . . . approved by the Commission. 39
This limitation on the reach of subsection 5 most likely will insulate
it from certain constitutional challenges. Subsection 6, however,
does not affect the operation of subsection 4's approval requirement. The approval requirements contained in the two subsections
have the potential to benefit incumbent managers of target utilities
by providing time in which to respond to hostile takeover bids.
Because the constitutionality of such an Act has not yet been
considered by the Supreme Court, 140 potential constitutional issues
merit consideration.
A.

Commerce Clause

Commerce clause analysis usually begins with two threshold
inquiries: (1) Does the statute discriminate against interstate commerce?; 141 and (2) Does the statute impermissibly burden interstate
commerce by subjecting activities to inconsistent regulations by
different states?'42 The Supreme Court has applied virtually a per
se rule of invalidity to state legislation that falls into either of these
143
two categories.

3I An affiliated acquiror is one "who directly, or indirectly through one or more
intermediaries, controls, or is controlled by, or is under common control with, such utility,
including any entity created at the discretion of such utility for purposes of corporate
reorganization." KRS § 278.020(6)(b) (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1989).
"I KRS § 278.020(b) (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1989).
140

See supra note 118.

"4See CTS v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 87-88 (1987) (citing Lewis
v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 36-37 (1980)).

"I See id. at 88-89 (citing Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor
Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 583-84 (1986)).
14
We have applied a "virtually per se rule of invalidity" against state laws
that amount to "simple economic protectionism," Philadelphia v. New Jersey,
437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978), ... and have found such protectionism when a
state law "directly regulates or discriminates against interstate commerce, or
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Kentucky's utility change-of-control legislation does not discriminate against interstate commerce. The Act regulates evenhandedly and imposes no burden on out-of-state acquirors that it
does not also impose on those in-state. However, because the Act
purports to confer jurisdiction on the PSC to pass judgment on
the acquisition of any utility furnishing utility service in Kentucky,
apparently even the acquisition by a nonresident of a foreign utility
that furnishes utility service in Kentucky,44 the Act creates a risk
might be subject to inconsistent regulation
that such an acquisition
45
states.
by different
Four justices in Edgar v. MITE 46 held that a similar extraterritorial assertion of jurisdiction rendered the Illinois Business Takeover Act unconstitutional as imposing an impermissible direct burden
on interstate commerce.1 47 Moreover, in upholding the constitutionality of the Indiana Control Share Acquisition Statute in CTS
Corp. v. Dynamics Corp.,'148 the Supreme Court specifically interpreted the statute to apply only to entities incorporated in Indiana. 49 Yet, because the limitations on states' power articulated in

when its effect is to favor in-state economic interests over out-of-state interests." Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476
U.S. 573, 579 (1986).
Northwest Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n of Kansas, 109 S. Ct. 1262, 1280
(1989).
1" The Act purports to confer jurisdiction on the PSC over any acquiror, "whether
or not organized under the laws of [Kentucky]," who wishes to "acquire control ... of
any utility furnishing utility service in [Kentucky]." KRS § 278.020(5) (Baldwin 1988)
(emphasis added).
M, Suppose, for example, that a hypothetical Ohio corporation, the Goldstar Gas
Company, has its principal place of business in Cincinnati, Ohio, but provides service to
customers across the Ohio River in northern Kentucky and derives the same percentage of
its gross revenue from this service as it does from its business in Ohio. Also, even if
Goldstar derived a great percentage of its gross revenue from Ohio rather than Kentucky,
there still would be a risk of inconsistent regulation since the proposed acquisition would
still be subject to prior PSC approval under KRS § 278.020(4). Further suppose that Ohio
has a utility change-of-control statute similar to that of Kentucky. If another hypothetical
corporation, the Brookings Gas Company, wishes to acquire control of Goldstar, it must
obtain prior approval of the transaction from the public service commissions of both states.
If Ohio's public service commission approves the proposed transaction but Kentucky's does
not, Brookings' takeover attempt would be subject to inconsistent state regulations.
-,6
457 U.S. 624 (1982) (Justices Powell, Stevens, and O'Connor all concurred with
Justice White that the statute's direct burden on interstate commerce was unconstitutional).
,,7
See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
'" 481 U.S. 69 (1987); see supra notes 104-17 and accompanying text.
" Although the definitional language of the Act suggests Indiana's legislature might
have intended the Act to cover foreign corporations with substantial ties with Indiana,
(Note, CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America: Of State Regulation, Tender Offers, and
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these cases in part depend upon the states' power over internal
corporate governance, the Kentucky Act arguably is distinguisha1 50
ble.
The restrictive interpretation of the Indiana Act follows from
the nature of the interest asserted therein. Because the Court accepted Indiana's justification for the Act as being an undisputed
interest in protecting those who invest in its domestic corporations,
logic required the Court to restrict the Act's application to such
domestic corporations. For while a state legitimately may legislate
to protect shareholders in its domestic corporations, it has no
interest flowing from its power over internal corporate governance
in protecting resident shareholders of out-of-state corporations.' 51
State regulation of the change of control of public utilities,
however, is not premised on the states' "firmly established ...
authority to regulate domestic corporations.' '1 52 Rather, such regulation proceeds from the power traditionally asserted by states
over utilities.5 3 States have a legitimate interest in protecting utility
customers as well as investors.1 54 Thus, Kentucky's undisputed

Necromancy, 77 Ky. L.J. 149, 175 & nn.187-89 (1988-89)), the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Act specifically precludes such a possibility. See CTS, 481 U.S. at 93 (holding
that the "Act applies only to corporations incorporated in Indiana"). Indeed, one commentator suggests "such an interpretation [was] a requirement for constitutionality." Note,
supra, at 184 (suggesting that in-state incorporation of target and substantial ties between
target and incorporating state might be constitutional prerequisites for state corporate
change-of-control statutes).
I" However, one commentator suggests that the Court declined to acknowledge that
the true purpose of the Indiana legislature was "the protect[ion] of local businesses," not
the protection of shareholders of domestic corporations, because of "its inability to formulate a workable test to identify legislative motive in the corporate context." Langervoort,
supra note 105, at 106-8. The commentator also notes that the Court "accepted at face
value the dubious legislative purpose of promoting shareholder autonomy." Id. at 111. See
also supra notes 106-11 and accompanying text.
"I Indeed, in upholding the Act, the Court stated: "We agree that Indiana has no
interest in protecting nonresident shareholders of nonresident corporations." CTS, 481 U.S.
at 93 (emphasis in original). See also MITE, 457 U.S. at 645-46 ("Illinois has no interest
in regulating the internal affairs of foreign corporations.").
112

CTS, 481 U.S. at 89.

See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
The Supreme Court has held that "the regulation of utilities is one of the most
important of the functions traditionally associated with the police power of the States."
Arkansas Elec. Corp. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 375, 377 (1983). See also
Great N. Ry. v. Washington, 300 U.S. 154, 159-60 (1937) (recognizing authority of states
to regulate structure of public utilities as component of states' police power over utilities).
While the manner in which the Kentucky Act progressed through the General Assembly
might suggest a more pecuniary impetus, the Supreme Court's reluctance in CTS to assess
the legislature's true motive likely precludes an attack on the Act as simply being economic
protectionism. See supra notes 19 and 150.
"'

14
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interest in protecting in-state ratepayers may countenance the limited extraterritorial assertion of jurisdiction contained in the utility
change-of-control statute. Without such jurisdiction, Kentucky
would be unable to ensure that an acquiror of a utility furnishing
utility service to its residents is "ready, willing, and able to continue
providing adequate service."' 5' 5 Any effects on interstate commerce
flowing from application of the Act's "attempt at consumer protection are incidental to the purpose of the statute" 156 and, there5 7
fore, do not constitute per se violations of the commerce clause.
The Act also appears to pass constitutional muster under the
much-maligned balancing test enunciated in Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc. 5 ' In light of the holding of CTS, belittling the importance of
keeping the national market for corporate securities free from state
regulation, 15 9 the burden on interstate commerce appears slight. On

' Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Cities of Southgate & Highland Heights, 268 S.W.2d 19, 21
(Ky. 1954).
,16 Baltimore Gas and Elec. Co. v. Heinz, 760 F.2d 1408, 1421 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,

474 U.S. 847 (1985).
" See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (holding that where a
"statute regulates evenhandedly ... and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental," there is no per se violation of the commerce clause).
1S 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). There is considerable debate on the continued applicability
of the Pike balancing test. See, e.g., Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp.,
Nos. 89-1581, 89-1712, 1989 U.S. App. Lexis 9024, at 28 (7th Cir. May 24, 1989) (noting
CTS majority "did not even cite [Pike] when dealing with a statute regulating only the
affairs of a firm incorporated in the state"); Hyde Park Partners v. Connolly, 839 F.2d
837, 844 (1st Cir. 1988) (Holding that "balancing test ... seem[s] to have been abandoned
by the CTS court where ... state law merely regulates intrastate 'corporate governance'."
(emphasis added)). See also supranotes 108-11 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court,
however, recently applied the Pike test to a state regulation in Northwest Central Pipeline
v. State Corp. Comm'n of Kansas, 109 S. Ct. 1262 (1989). The Court stated:
Even if not per se unconstitutional, a state law may violate the commerce
clause if it fails to pass muster under the balancing test outlined in Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc. Provided the challenged law "regulates evenhandedly to
effectuate a legitimate local public interest," however, "and its effects on
interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden
imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits."
Id. at 1282 (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
159See CTS, 481 U.S. at 92 ("The Constitution does not require the states to subscribe
to any particular economic theory."); id. at 93-94 (Rejecting 'notion that the Commerce
Clause protects the particular structure or methods of operation in a ... market'.") (quoting
Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 127 (1978)). The Court may have
been influenced by an abatement of academic support for takeovers. See, e.g., Bebchuk,
Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers, 98 HAv. L.
REv. 1693, 1722-23 (1985); Coffee, Regulating the Market for CorporateControl: A Critical
Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in CorporateGovernance, 84 CoLtrm. L. REv. 249,
307-9 (1983).
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the other hand, the legitimacy of a state's interest in regulating
public utilities is beyond dispute'60 and, indeed, is a fundamental
aspect of contemporary views on utilities. 161 Thus, it appears the
Kentucky Act will survive all commerce clause challenges, including
those under the Pike balancing test.
B.

Supremacy Clause

Opponents of Kentucky's approval requirement also may charge
that federal legislation pre-empts the state's utility change-of-control statute. Specifically, opponents may charge that the Kentucky
statute conflicts with federal securities laws, the PUCHA, the FPA
and/or the NGA.
It is clear that "Congress has the authority, in exercising its
Article I powers, to pre-empt state law.' ' 62 Supremacy clause analysis therefore must focus on Congressional intent. 63 When federal
legislation is alleged to pre-empt state law "in a field," such as
utility regulation, that is "traditionally occupied by the States, 'we
start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the
States were not to be superseded unless that was the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress.' "164 Thus, because there is no
express statement of Congressional intent to pre-empt state authority over utility service as asserted in utility change-of-control
statutes, supremacy clause challenges likely will fail.
1.

Williams Act

Kentucky's utility change-of-control statute requires potential
acquirers to obtain prior approval from the PSC for any proposed
transaction that would effect a statutory change-in-control. In Edgar v. MITE Corp.,165 a plurality of three Justices held that such
a pre-acquisition approval requirement frustrates important pur-

160 See

supra note 154.

161 See

supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
v. ARC American Corp., 490 U.S ....

162 California

104 L.Ed 2d 86, 94

(1989).
163 See, e.g., Northwest Central Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n of Kansas, No.
86-1856, slip op. at
-,
1989 WL 19010 at 12 (U.S. March 6, 1989); Schneidewind v.
ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S.
-,
-,
99 L.Ed 2d 316, 325 (1988); California Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. 683, 689 (1987).
164 California v. ARC, 104 L.Ed 2d at 94 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). See also, e.g., Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical
Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 716 (1985).
61 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
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poses of and therefore is pre-empted by the Williams Act.' 66 There
was no express pre-emption, however. Rather, this was an example
of pre-emption by frustration of broadly-interpreted Congressional
purposes and objectives. 167 As noted above, Congressional intent
to pre-empt state law in a field traditionally occupied by the States,

such as utility regulation, must be "clear and manifest. ' 168 Courts
should not and indeed have been hesitant to imply a Congressional
intent to pre-empt traditional state power from broad and abstract
69
federal goals.

Even under the broad interpretation of the Williams Act's
principles espoused by Justice White in MITE, 170 Kentucky's utility
change-of-control statute does not appear susceptible to Supremacy
Clause challenges. The new Kentucky Act imposes at most a sixtyday delay.' 7' Justice White's pre-emption analysis in MITE prohibits only "unreasonable delay[s].' 1 72 Any such delay, however, might

'66See supra notes 87-94 and accompanying text.

,,7
See also, e.g., Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S.
-,
99 L.Ed 2d
316 (1988).
"' See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
,6 See, e.g., California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S.
-,
105 L.Ed 2d 86
(1989) (holding a state law not pre-empted by broadly-framed objectives of federal antitrust laws); Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983) (holding state action retarding development of nuclear
power in California for purportedly economic reasons did not frustrate general federal
objective-the promotion of nuclear power). Even where Congressional goals are more
precise, courts have been reluctant to imply an intent to pre-empt state action in a field
traditionally occupied by the States. See, e.g., Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S.
238 (1984) (holding traditional state tort law on damages not pre-empted by federal occupation of field of nuclear safety); Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co., 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984) (holding state's strict products-liability cause of
action not pre-empted by federal occupation of field of labeling requirements of pesticide).
170See supra notes 87-94 and accompanying text. The Court in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics
Corp., 481 U.S. 69 (1987) purported to apply, albeit without accepting, this broad interpretation. See Id. at 82, 107 S. Ct. 1645. One commentator opines that if the Court did in
fact use this interpretive approach, its "analysis ... [was] thoroughly unconvincing."
Langervoort, supra note 105, at 111.
'
The Commission shall grant, modify, refuse or prescribe appropriate terms
and conditions with respect to every such application within sixty (60) days
after the filing of the application there for or on a later date mutually
acceptable to the Commission and the acquiror. In the absence of any such
action within such period of time, any such proposed acquisition shall be
deemed to be approved.
KRS § 278.020(5). Subsection (4), however, does not contain a time-frame for PSC action.
If a proposed transaction is subject to prior PSC approval under subsection (4) but not (5),
see infra note 180 and accompanying text, unreasonable delays by the PSC could conflict
with federal objectives.
I- MITE, 457 U.S. at 639.
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operate to the benefit of incumbent management in a hostile takeover contest in contravention of the scheme of strict regulatory
neutrality contemplated by the Williams Act. The Court in CTS
disposed of such a concern by noting a potential acquiror could
make his offer conditional on the required shareholder approval.
Such logic has been extended to utility change-of-control transactions. 173 Finally, the approval requirement contained in Kentucky's
utility change-of-control statute does not remove decision-making
authority from investors and place it with the PSC. The PSC's
inquiry traditionally has been limited to the effect of the changeof-control transaction on Kentucky ratepayers and has not included
74
an examination of the fairness of the terms of the transaction.
2.

Federal Utility Legislation

Opponents of Kentucky's utility change-of-control statute also
might claim the statute conflicts with federal utility legislation. As
noted above, 175 certain utility change-of-control transactions may
require the approval of a federal regulatory body. If the Kentucky
PSC denies an application for the approval of a transaction already
or subsequently approved by a federal regulatory agency, operation
of the Kentucky statute could conflict with federal law by prohibiting conduct specifically encouraged by federal action. 176 However,
the Kentucky statute evinces a willingness to defer to the public
interest inquiries of other competent regulatory bodies. 177 Thus, the
reasonable application of the Kentucky statute is unlikely to conflict with the operation of federal law.
C. Application
Read together, KRS § 278.020(4) and (5) require prior PSC
approval of almost all transactions effecting a change in the control
of a utility providing service in Kentucky. If the utility derives a
greater percentage of its gross revenue from business in Kentucky
than it does from any other jurisdiction, both subsections apply.

,71See PSC Order, In re The Transfer of Control of Telemarketing Communications
of So. Ky., Case No. 10408 (Feb. 3, 1989) (terms of transfer agreement subject to PSC
approval).
174 See supra notes 118-30 and accompanying text.
171 See supra notes 25-51 and accompanying text.
176 For an example of pre-emption by this type of conflict, see
Nash v. Florida
Industrial Commission, 389 U.S. 235, 239 (1967).
'77 See infra note 181 and accompanying text.
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If the utility derives a greater percentage of its gross revenue from

business in another jurisdiction than from business in Kentucky,
KRS § 278.020(b)(a) exempts the change-of-control transaction from

subsection 5's approval requirement if the PSC "determines that
the other jurisdiction ...

afford[s] protection to ratepayers in

[Kentucky] substantially equal to that afforded such ratepayers by
subsection (5).' 178 Subsection 6, however, does not obviate the
need for prior PSC approval required by subsection 4, and "per-

son[s] under the jurisdiction of the commission" 179 must still seek
prior PSC approval to acquire or transfer control of a utility
deriving less than one-half its gross revenue from business in Kentucky.'8 0 The active supervision of such a utility by a regulatory
body in another jurisdiction, however, likely would lower the level
of scrutiny exercised by the PSC over any change-of-control trans181
action involving the utility.
Kentucky's new utility change-of-control statute provides that
the PSC "shall approve any ... proposed acquisition when it finds
that the same is to be made in accordance with law, for a proper
purpose and is consistent with the public interest.' '8 2 In passing

-I- KRS § 278.020(6)(a).
179 KRS § 278.020(4). KRS § 278.040(2) provides: "The jurisdiction of the commission
shall extend to all utilities in this state." KRS § 278.010(3) defines utility as "any person
except a city, who owns, controls or operates or manages any facility used or to be used
for or in connection with" furnishing utility service. This language does not appear to
include a parent coporation of a utility operating a facility providing utility service in
Kentucky. See PSC Order, In re The Application of Kentucky Utilities Co. To Enter Into
An Agreement and Plan To Carry Out Certain Transactions In Connection Therewith, Case
No. 10296, at 17 (Oct. 6, 1988) (finding proposed holding company would not, by reason
of its ownership all outstanding common stock of utility, be a utility as defined in KRS §
278.010(3); holding company would not "own, control, operate, or manage any facilities
used in connection with" furnishing utility service). But see PSC Order, The Application
of ITT Communications, Inc. and Metromedia Long Distance, Inc. For Approval To
Acquire Control, Case No. 89-106, at 2 (June 30, 1989) (applying subsection (4) based on
PSC jurisdiction over the utility rather than over the parties to the change-of-control
transaction, acquiror and the utility's parent company).
'9 See PSC Order, In re The Transfer of Control of Telemarketing Communications
of So. Ky., Case No. 10408 (Feb. 3, 1989) (subjecting transfer of control of a utility to
subsection (4) but not subsection (5) approval requirement where utility derives greater
portion of its gross revenue from interstate business than from business in Kentucky).
' Although limited by express language to subsection (5), the logic underlying subsection (6)(a) applies with equal force to subsection (4). If another jurisdiction with a stake
in the proposed transaction greater than Kentucky's approves the transaction, and the
Kentucky PSC determines the other jurisdiction's approval process afforded protection to
Kentucky ratepayers comparable to that which it would have provided, the Kentucky PSC
should not expend its resources to duplicate the other jurisdiction's inquiry.
,"2 Act of April 9, 1988, ch. 335, supra note 2.
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judgment on proposed acquisitions, the PSC has applied an approval standard similar to that of the past.'8 3 Thus the PSC has
construed the term "public interest" narrowly to mean absence of
184
an adverse impact on consumer service.
CONCLUSION

Kentucky's utility change-of-control legislation reflects a more
general trend on the part of states to protect local corporate
interests from hostile takeovers." 5 Because the utility industry by
nature is subject to extensive supervision for the protection of
consumers, the statute appears to serve a more compelling local
interest and to cover a subject more appropriately left to local
regulation than general corporate antitakeover statutes. 8 6 Thus, the
statute likely will be held constitutional. In any event, no matter
whether an acquiror chooses to comply with or contest the statute,
time delays are inevitable. This in turn makes utility takeovers

"I For a discussion of standards applied prior to the passage of subsection (5), see
supra notes 119-28 and accompanying text. The PSC inquiry has continued to focus on
whether the potential acquiror has the "financial, technical, and managerial abilities to
provide reasonable service." See, e.g., In re The Application of Hancock County Public
Improvement Corp. and Hancock County, Ky. For Approval of an Agreement of Sale
Providing For the Purchase By the East Daviess County Water Ass'n From Hancock County
Public Improvement Corp. of the Corp.'s Existing Waterworks Distribution System, Case
No. 89-135, at 2 (June 30, 1989) (approving proposed transaction upon finding that acquiror
"has the financial, technical, and managerial abilities to provide reasonable service ...,
and that the proposed transfer ... is consistent with the requirements of KRS § 278.020(4)
and (5)"); PSC Order, In re Joint Application of Blue Grass Management Group, Inc. to
Transfer 51 Present Interest of TMC of Lexington to JTC Communications Corp. (now
J.T. Carneal), and For Authorization to Provide Resale of Telecommunications Services,
Case No. 89-038, at 3 (June 28, 1989) (approving proposed transaction where after its
consummation transferred utility "will maintain the financial, technical, and managerial
abilities to provide reasonable services").
114If the PSC determines that the aquiror has the requisite abilities and that the
proposed transaction will not harm consumers, it will approve the transaction. See, e.g.,
id.; In re TMC of Lexington, Case No. 89-038, at 3 (noting approved transaction "will not
result in any detriment to the customers"); PSC Order, In re The Application of ITT
Communicatins, Inc. and Metromedia Long Distance, Inc. For Approval to Acquire Control, Case No. 89-106, at 2 (noting approved transaction "will not harm consumer"). Cf.
Application of Robert P. Trimble to Transfer the Land, and Physical Assets of the Thelma
Activities Sewage Treatment Systems in Johnson County, Ky. to Billy Robert King, Case
No. 10282 (Oct. 28, 1988) (denying premature application for transfer of control where
acquiror failed to show he had requisite abilities to provide reasonable utility service). For
a discussion of criteria used in passing judgment on utility merger transactions, see Nolan,
Determination of the Public Interest-Utility Merger Cases, 109 PuB. UT. FORT., June
10, 1982, at 62-3.
"'
See Langervoort, supra note 105, at 96.
"
See supra notes 105-30 and accompanying text.
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more risky and thus less attractive to potential acquirors, making
a rare breed rarer.
John Park

